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NOTE
MAY WE PLEAD THE COURT? TWOMBLY, IQBAL,
AND THE "NEW" PRACTICE OF PLEADING
I.

INTRODUCTION

As of June 30, 2009, the Supreme Court decision Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly' has been cited by federal courts and tribunals nearly
24,000 times, making it the seventh most-cited case of all time.2
Twombly replaced fifty-year-old precedent, shifted the focus of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), and became the case to cite
to when litigating the sufficiency of one's complaint.3 The backlash
following the Twombly decision was pervasive,4 with some
commentators arguing that the Supreme Court has effectively heightened
the formerly liberal pleading standards of the FRCP 5 and others
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Adam N. Steinman, The PleadingProblem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1295 & n.9 (2010).
3. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the Twombly majority of
rewriting the country's civil procedure textbooks with their decision).
4. See Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1811, 1811-12 (2008)
("Thus, when the Supreme Court recently spoke on this issue in the case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, the American bar rightfully took notice." (footnote omitted)); see also Robert G. Bone,
Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REv. 873, 875 (2009)
("Many judges and academic commentators read the decision as overturning fifty years of generous
notice pleading practice, and critics attack it as a sharp departure from the 'liberal ethos' of the
Federal Rules .... ); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv
473, 474 (2010) ("Scholarly reaction to Twombly has been largely critical .... ); Douglas G. Smith,
The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 1063, 1063 (2009) ("No decision in recent memory
has generated as much interest and is of such potentially sweeping scope as the Supreme Court's
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.").
5. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief"); see also Bone, supra note 4, at 875 ("[M]any judges and
academic commentators read the decision as overturning fifty years of generous notice pleading
practice, and critics attack it as a sharp departure from the 'liberal ethos' of the Federal
Rules. . .. "); Harnett, supra note 4, at 474 ("Scholars have criticized the Court for abandoning
decades of precedent and rejecting ideas central to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Jason
Bartlett, Comment, Into the Wild: The Uneven and Self-Defeating Effects of Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 75, 83-85 (2009) (examining how Twombly
"redefined the meaning of Rule 8(a)(2)'s ... short and plain statement").
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claiming that the Twombly decision does not drastically alter these
rules.6 Those who speculated that the Twombly decision might be
limited in scope to antitrust litigation7 were corrected by the Supreme
Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,8 which laid to rest any such
speculation by decreeing that Twombly set the standard for "all civil
actions." 9 Although the Supreme Court disclaimed in Twombly that "[i]n
reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any 'heightened' pleading
standard[,]"' 0 the practical effect of its decision on the lower courts has
been resounding." The revised (if not heightened) pleading standard,
known as "plausibility pleading,"l 2 was controversial enough to provoke
lawmakers to introduce legislation seeking to undo the effects of both
Twombly and Iqbal.13 The Supreme Court's decision in Twombly was
6. Bone, supra note 4, at 877 ("Twombly does not alter pleading rules in as drastic a way as
many of its critics, and even some of its few defenders, suppose."); see also Smith, supra note 4, at
1064 ("The majority in Twombly undertook a careful analysis based on the text and purpose of the
Federal Rules, articulating a standard that is relatively clear.").
7. See Anthony Martinez, Case Note, PlausibilityAmong the Circuits: An Empirical Survey
of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 ARK. L. REv. 763, 782-83 (2009) (discussing how the Ninth
Circuit limited Twombly to antitrust litigation); see also Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie
Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of JudicialFederalism?), 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 245, 318 n.407 (2008) ("To read Twombly as stating a general principle of
federal procedural law, under which plaintiffs in all kinds of cases must provide greater factual
detail to get past the pleadings phase, could interfere with substantive rights.").
8. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
9. Id. at 1953 ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil
actions' . . . and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike." (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1)).
10. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007).
11. See, e.g., Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552
F.3d 430, 434 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) ("This Court has cited the heightened pleading standard of
Twombly in a wide variety of cases, not simply limiting its applicability to antitrust actions."
(emphasis added)); see also Taylor Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 531, 537 (2009)
("In Iqbal, the Court discussed, in detail, the 'two working principles' of Twombly's heightened
pleadingrequirements." (emphasis added) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949)); Angell v. Burrell (In
re Careamerica, Inc.), 409 B.R. 759, 767 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2009) ("Rather, § 548(a)(1)(B) claims
must satisfy Rule 8(a) and the heightened pleading standard introduced in Twombly and lqbal."
(emphasis added)).
12. Robert G. Bone, PlausibilityPleadingRevisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 849, 851 (2010).
13. Senator Arlen Specter (D-Pa.) has proposed a bill in the Senate entitled the "Notice
Pleading Restoration Act," which seeks to reinstate the pleading standards as they were before the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions. Howard Wasserman, Overturning Twombly and lqbal,
PRAWFSBLAWG (July 22, 2009, 3:39 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/07/
overturning-twombly-and-iqbal.html ("Sen. Arlen Specter this week will introduce the Notice
Pleading Restoration Act to overturn Twombly and Iqbal and reinstate Conley v. Gibson and 'no set
of facts' as the controlling federal pleading standard." (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957))); see also David Ingram, Specter Proposes Return to PriorPleading Standard, THE BLT:
THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (July 23, 2009, 11:43 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/
2009/07/specter-proposes-return-to-prior-pleading-standard.html ("Sen. Arlen Specter (D-Pa.) filed
legislation Wednesday designed to return the standard to what it was prior to 2007 . . . ."),
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founded on policy concerns, most notably the rising trend of plaintiffs
with factually weak claims seeking to open the doors to enormously
expensive discoveryl 4 and the modest success of judges supervising
abusive discovery.' 5 The Twombly decision can be seen as the Supreme
Court's response to these policy issues, and the Iqbal decision further
built on Twombly's foundation. Giving district court judges the ability to
screen more cases at the pleading stage rather than waiting until the
summary judgment stage enhances judicial economy and should be seen
as a welcome departure from the basic notice pleading system of the
recent past. In doing so, however, some potential plaintiffs will find
themselves disenfranchised and unable to obtain the proper information
they need to adequately state their legal claims in the face of dismissal.
Therefore, this Note argues for a balance to be struck that will arm these
potentially disenfranchised plaintiffs with some recourse and, ultimately,
their day in court.
Part II of this Note will recap the history of pleading regimes from
common law times until 2002.16 The discussion will start with pleading
practice as it evolved from the common law to the advent of the FRCP.'"
Each section will briefly explain the context in which the different
pleading regimes were developed and highlight the features that were
further implemented or cast aside for future regimes. 8 Part II will
further discuss the concept that the FRCP and its proponents sought to
promote access to the courts rather than restrict it.19 Part II will end with
a discussion of two Supreme Court cases that established the liberal
ethos of pre-Twombly pleading practice.2 0
Part III will outline the current pleading debate by discussing the
trilogy of cases that the Supreme Court has recently ruled on: Twombly,
Erickson v. Pardus,21 and Iqbal.22 This discussion will start with the
wrench that Twombly threw into the gears of pleading doctrine.2 3 After
that, Part III will discuss Erickson and the Supreme Court's attempt to
revert back to the liberal ethos of the FRCP.24 Then, Iqbal will be
discussed, thus completely setting the stage for the present pleading

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635, 638 (1989)).
See infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part I.A.1-2.
See infra Part 11.
See discussion infra Part L.B.
See infra Part II.B.2-3.
551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).
See infra Part Ill.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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problem. 25 Finally, Part III will conclude with a discussion of how the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions have reinforced a new narrative of
pleading practice, how the lower courts are adopting this new narrative,
and the unintended consequences thereof.26
Part IV will argue for a system to be implemented that allows brief,
targeted discovery before a complaint has been filed when a plaintiff
finds himself unable to plausibly state his claim for relief because he
does not have access to necessary information. 27 This section will begin
by discussing the current state of the FRCP and using that basis to carve
out the "Iqbal Motion" proposed herein-where plaintiffs lacking
necessary information to plausibly plead their case have an opportunity
to gather that information. 28 The discussion will continue by addressing
the obvious concerns that would arise as a response to creating a system
of pre-filing discovery. 29 These concerns consist of the Iqbal Motion's
potentially negative effect on judicial economy 30 and fairness to
defendants, an important concern in both Twombly and Iqbal.3 1 Part IV
will conclude by discussing how the Iqbal Motion will address these
concerns and strike a balance between efficiency and justice. 32
II.

FROM THE ARCHAIC CODE TO THE LIBERAL NOTICE: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF PLEADING STANDARDS

A. PleadingStandardsBefore the Adoption ofFRCP
To put the current controversy regarding pleading and the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions into perspective, it makes sense to recount how the
practice of pleading has evolved over time, starting with the common
law pleading system, which gave way to the code pleading system,
which in turn gave way to the notice pleading system.3 3

25. See discussion infra Part III.C.
26. See discussion infra Part III.D.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1-2. The "Iqbal Motion," crafted and proposed by the
author, would serve as a pre-filing, pre-suit request by a potential plaintiff who wishes to obtain
critical information necessary to plead a sufficient complaint and cannot obtain that information any
other legal way.
29. See infra Part IV.B.
30. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1.
31. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
32. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1-2.
33. Common-Law Pleading, L. LIBR.-AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., http://law.jrank.org/pages/
5452/Common-Law-Pleading.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
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1. Common Law Pleading
Common law pleading, or issue pleading, was developed in
England in the thirteenth century.3 4 When a citizen sought relief, he
needed to obtain the proper writ-a right of action that was recognized
by the King. Upon purchasing and receiving the appropriate writ, the
plaintiff then needed to frame or formulate the issues of his claim so that
they were identifiable. At common law, the functions of pleading were
to reduce the controversy to a single, clear-cut, well-defined issue of fact
or law; to eliminate immaterial matter to aid in admitting or rejecting
evidence; to give notice to the parties of the respective claims and
defenses of the adversaries; to guide the court in apportioning the burden
of proof between parties; to serve as a basis for the judgment; and to
preserve a record to prevent relitigation of the same issue between the
same parties in the future. 37 Though no longer followed, the common
law pleading system "has served each succeeding generation as an
effective instrument in the Administration of Justice, and today is still
very much alive, both as an Operating System and as a guiding force in
the recurring Waves of Reform designed to correct its abuses."38 These
words resound amongst the present controversy regarding federal
pleading practice. Although lampooned for its rigidity, the common law
pleading system, along with its system of specialized pleadings, did also
include a simple and direct system of allegation which served as the
formulaic basis for certain actions at law.39 Interestingly enough, the use
of highly-formalized demands or answers in place of counsel's simple
oral responses to the complaint was a byproduct of the development of
England's jury system. 40 The movement for pleading reform then was
understandably led by laymen and the delay of the reform movement
was a result of the bar's opposition.4 1
34. Umair Khan & Robert Magee, Twombly Trumps Conley: Ashcroft v. lqbal and the Quest
for a Standard Pleading Standard, ALB. Gov'T L. REV. FIREPLACE (Feb. 27, 2009),
http://glrfireplace.albanygovemmentlawreview.org/2009/02/27/twombly-trumps-conley-ashcroft-viqbal-and-the-quest-for-a-standard-pleading-standard/.
35. Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal
Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 99 (1994).
36. Id.
37.

JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 13 (4th

ed. 1986).
38. Id. at 3.
39. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, in 2 F.R.D. 456, 458 (1943) ("Indeed, it is
interesting to see how the true common-law pleading had at one and the same time a simple system
of direct allegation which is even now the basis of the federal forms of complaints in negligence and
contract. . . .").
40. The reasoning for this is explained by Clark: "The system lent itself to prolonged paper
disputations, of which advantage was taken by lawyers naturally anxious to obtain admissions from
their opponents without committing themselves." Id. It was this side of the common law pleading
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The common law pleading system had obvious shortcomings.42
Most notable was its infamous rigidity,4 3 which led to those with worthy
claims unable to obtain redress because of some unfortunate
misstatement in the pleadings." As time moved on, more people were
seeking recovery and redress for their substantive rights 45 and were
unable to do so because of the common law pleading system's inability
to adapt to the growth of those substantive rights.46 Common law
pleading inherently subordinated substance to form. 4 7 The common law
pleading system was truly arcane, preoccupying itself with unnecessarily
specialized allegations and was unworkably inefficient and costly. 4 8
Despite numerous attempts to reform this archaic system, it was not until
1848 that the movement to reform pleading reached a significant
"milestone." 49
2. Code Pleading
New York became the first state to adopt the David Dudley Field
Code ("Field Code") and by the time the FRCP was enacted, more than
half of the states had adopted their own version of the Field Code.o
Code pleading distanced itself from the common law's issue pleading
and moved toward a system where pleadings were used more for
developing the facts rather than forming the issues. Most importantly,
the Field Code sought to merge the courts of equity and law to promote
efficiency and to allow petitioners to seek, and courts to grant, both legal
system that brought it into disfavor. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 35, at 100 (noting the "rigidity of the pleading system");
Khan & Magee, supra note 34 (discussing the "shortcomings of the common law standard").
43. Brooks, supra note 35, at 100.
44. See Common-Law Pleading,supra note 33.
45. Khan & Magee, supra note 34.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING

IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 31 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2002) (1897)); see also Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 962 (1987) ("Throughout his life, [Charles E.] Clark kept
repeating that procedure should be subservient to substance, a means to an end, the 'handmaid and
not the mistress to justice."' (citing Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid ofJustice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q.
297, 297 (1938))).
48. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth ofNotice Pleading,45 ARiz. L. REV. 987, 990 (2003).
49. Brooks, supra note 35, at 100; see also Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a
Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1989) (noting that the "New York Field Code became a model for
procedural reform in many other states"). The long delay in pleading reform was a result of the
bar's opposition. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
50. Brooks, supranote 35, at 100.
51. Id.
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and equitable relief.5 2 A mere statement of the facts became sufficient to
tell the court one's case. 3 This statement of the facts required such
simplicity that, purportedly, even a child at the time could sufficiently
draft one.5 4 However, despite this newfound emphasis on simplicity,
courts still found themselves reverting back to requiring more detailed
pleadings 5 5-a trend that has repeated itself continuously to this very
day.56 The judges of the era applied the code rules very strictly,
emphasizing the "hopeless distinctions among allegations of ultimate
fact, legal conclusions, and evidentiary facts" 5 -distinctions that were
much easier to talk about than to apply.5 8 This led to more waste,
inefficiency, and ultimately, an obstruction to justice rather than a path
to justice.59 Thus, pleading standards needed further reformation, but
with strict adherence to succinctness and simplicity.60
B.

The FRCP, Rule 8(a), and Its PleadingProgeny

The advent of the FRCP broke down the ivory towers upon which
common law pleading and code pleading stood. 6 1 The drafters realized it
was not necessary to distinguish between facts and legal conclusions.62
The FRCP established what is now commonly known as the "notice

52. See id. at 100-01.
53. See Clark,supra note 39, at 459.
54. Id. (noting that the common law emphasis on issue pleading shifted to requiring "a
statement of the facts, so simple, it was said at the time, that even a child could write a letter to the
court telling of its case").
55. Id.
56. See Bone, supra note 4, at 897 (discussing how federal courts in the 1980s tightened
pleading requirements as a response to increasing litigation costs and filing of frivolous suits).
57. Id.at891.
58. Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. lqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to
UnconstitutionalShores, 88 NEB. L. REv. 261, 267 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 574 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
59. See Clark, supra note 39, at 460 ("Therefore, it may be concluded that this tendency to
seek admissions by detailed pleadings is at best wasteful, inefficient, and time-consuming, and at
most productive of confusion as to the real merits of the cause and even of actual denial of
justice.").
60. See id. ("[The failures of past pleading reform] demonstrates, in the writer's judgment, the
necessity of procedural rules which enforce the mandate of simplicity and directness .... .").
61. See Bone, supra note 12, at 864 ("[T]he drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
eliminated the code distinction between facts and legal conclusions."); see also Brooks, supra note
35, at 102 ("[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provide the most modem and liberal set
of procedural rules available in American courts."); Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler,
Comments on ProceduralReform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLuM. L. REv. 518, 522 (1957)
(discussing how the drafters of the FRCP adopted a new terminology and abandoned terms used in
code pleading because of the terms' obscurity).
62. See Bone, supra note 12, at 865; see also Weinstein & Distler, supra note 61, at 522
(recalling how the FRCP retired the terms "ultimate facts," "material facts," and "cause of action").
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pleading" system.6 3 However, it is imperative to the present-day issue to
note that nowhere in the FRCP is there an explicit mention of "notice
pleading."" This realization has led at least one commentator to
postulate that this notion of notice pleading was simply a myth that grew
over time against the backdrop of the seemingly draconian pleading
practices of the past.6 5 However, until the recent decisions in Twombly
and Iqbal, it was a widely-accepted idea that the FRCP propounded a
very liberal approach to pleading,6 6 which provided the keys to "the gate
through which all disputes must pass." 67
1. Rule 8(a)(2) and the FRCP
Rule 8(a)(2) of the FRCP provides that: "[A] pleading that states a
claim for relief must contain . .. a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."68 The prevailing theory
behind Rule 8(a)(2) from the drafters' perspective was to simplify the
system, and to "give[] fair notice of what the dispute is about."6 9 Charles
E. Clark, architect of the FRCP and reporter of the 1938 Advisory
Committee, realized, however, that his very liberal ideals might not be
shared by all the other members of the Advisory Committee.o
Moreover, if it were up to Clark, the practice of pleading motions
would have been eliminated altogether.' In fact, for two decades after
the FRCP was enacted, courts continued to disagree over what the
proper pleading standard should be.72 Some jurists insisted that
specificity in pleading was integral in properly framing a lawsuit and

63. Brooks, supra note 35, at 103; see also Steinman, supra note 2, at 1295 ("Before [the
Twombly and !qbal) decisions, federal courts followed an approach known as notice
pleading. . . .").
64. See Bone, supra note 4, at 892.
65. See Fairman, supra note 48, at 988 (noting that every federal circuit has imposed "nonRule-based heightened pleading in direct contravention of notice pleading doctrine").
66. Steinman, supranote 2, at 1297.
67. Hannon, supranote 4, at 1811.
68. FED R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The full text of FCRP 8(a) is as follows:
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.
Id. 8(a).
69. Bone, supranote 12, at 865.
70. Bone, supranote 4, at 892-93.
71. Fairman, supra note 48, at 992.
72. Bone, supranote 4, at 892-93.
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making it manageable,7 3 whereas others, such as Clark (who was later
appointed as a judge to the Second Circuit), actively tried to establish
Rule 8(a)(2) simply to require notice, denouncing efforts to construe it
otherwise.74 Although the extremities of Clark's views were not
adopted, the prevailing thought was that the FRCP, especially Rule
12(b)(6), 75 was to be construed to contain a presumption against
throwing out pleadings for failing to state a claim for which relief can be
granted.
The drafters sought to create a straightforward and
uncomplicated litigation roadmap that started with simple notice to the
opposition, easy access to discovery, and, ultimately, a trial where the
case should be adjudicated based on "what actually happened rather than
on legal technicalities."7 7 Simplicity is rarely found in the law, however,
and despite how feasible it seemed at the time, the nature of modem
litigation prevents us from following such a roadmap as it was
conceived.
The liberal overtones of the new notice pleading system must be
viewed in light of the times in which it was created. In the earlytwentieth century, the complex mega-trials of today were virtually
unknown.78 The drafters did not and could not anticipate, for example, a
nation-wide class action suit consisting of hundreds of thousands of
plaintiffs.79 Were the Advisory Committee of 1938 to take place today,
it is almost a certainty that the arena of modem litigation would have
heavily influenced their ultimately liberal ideals regarding pleading
practice. Sadly, they were not availed this foresight.
2. Conley v. Gibson ' and Its "No Set of Facts" Standard
Nearly twenty years after the creation of the FRCP, the Supreme
Court in Conley created the paradigm for pleading standards and
solidified Rule 8(a) as a notice-pleading requirement.82 In doing so, the

73. Id. at 892.
74. Id. at 892-93.
75. "Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive
pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion: . .. (6) failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . ." FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
76. Fairman, supra note 48, at 992.
77. Bone, supranote 4, at 895.
78. Id. at 895-96.
79. Such was the case in Twombly. See id. at 896 ("Many cases were rather small affairs; the
huge, complex case of today was relatively unknown.").
80. Id. at 897 ("Indeed, Charles Clark emphasized ... the importance of revising those Rules
to keep pace with changing litigation conditions.").
81. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
82. See id. at 45-46.
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Court effectively ended the controversy as to how to apply the rule,
albeit until Twombly and Iqbal were decided.
a. The Conley Decision
Conley involved a group of black railroad workers who sought
relief from their union for failing to protect them when their jobs were
taken away and their positions replaced with white workers." The
complaint alleged that the union failed to represent Negro employees
equally and in good faith, in contravention of the union agreement. 84
The union moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be given. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address an important issue concerning
employee rights.86
Justice Black wrote the decision for the Supreme Court, and held
that the lower courts were incorrect in deciding that they lacked
jurisdiction. 87 He then turned to the motion to dismiss and, relying on
earlier cases, held that petitioners' complaint did indeed set forth a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
To test the complaint's
sufficiency, Justice Black followed "the accepted rule that a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiffcan prove no set offacts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief." 89 Petitioners' complaint
alleged a wrongful discharge by the union who protected the jobs of
white employees over the black employees, and that the union refused to
address petitioners' grievances because they were black. 90 If these
allegations were proven true, Justice Black reasoned, then there would
be a breach on the part of the union of its lawful and statutorily imposed
duty to represent its members fairly and equally without
discrimination.91
To the argument that the complaint was bereft of specific facts and
therefore required dismissal, Justice Black simply relied on the FRCP.92
He noted that the FRCP makes no requirement that the claims in the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 42-43.
Id at 43.
Id.
Id at 44.
Id. at 42, 44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 47.
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complaint be substantiated with detailed facts upon which the claims are
based. 93 For support, Justice Black took note of the forms in the
appendix of the FRCP. 94 The Supreme Court ultimately held that the
petitioners' complaint adequately set forth a claim for relief for which
they were entitled and that it gave the respondents fair notice of its
basis.95 As parting words, Justice Black expressed that the FRCP rejects
the notion that "pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept[s] the principle that
the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." 96
b. The Conley Decision in Hindsight
Although it could hardly be claimed that Conley would not pass
muster under present-day pleading standards, the complicated landscape
of modem-day litigation renders as moot at least some of Justice Black's

reasoning. 97
Justice Black noted that simplified notice pleading, as established
by the FRCP, was feasible because of the FRCP's "liberal opportunity
for discovery and the other pretrial procedures ... to disclose more
precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more
narrowly the disputed facts and issues."9 8 This opportunity to gain easy
discovery was a compelling reason why, fifty years later, the Supreme
Court in Twombly retired Conley's "no set of facts" language. 99
93. Id.
94. Id. This seemingly innocent point has been recycled and reused by jurists and
commentators alike unable to reconcile the standard propounded in Twombly and the original intent
behind the FRCP. See, e.g., Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575-76 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The pleading paradigm under the new Federal Rules was well illustrated by the
inclusion in the appendix of Form 9, a complaint for negligence."); Scott Dodson, Pleading
Standards After Bell Altantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 141 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf ("[I]f the 'plausibility' standard
extends beyond the antitrust context, then these examples are in tension with Form 9 . . . ."); Allan
Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal PleadingPractice, in 243 F.R.D.
604, 633 (2007) (noting that it is almost impossible to distinguish between the "supposedly
sufficient ... Form 9, where no specific facts of negligence are alleged and the supposedly
inadequate, 'fact-deficient' allegation of an antitrust conspiracy (or any other type of conspiracy)");
Jason G. Gottesman, Comment, Speculating as to the Plausible: Pleading Practice After Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973, 981 (2008) ("[A]ccording to Form 9... a
complaint is sufficient so long as it states the particular time and place of the alleged injury and an
allegation that the defendant did or did not do something.").
95. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
96. Id.
97. For a discussion of how the FRCP was created in a time where the litigation landscape
was less complex, see supranotes 80-82 and accompanying text.
98. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48.
99. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
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3. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.: 00 The Calm Before the Storm
In 2002, the Supreme Court once again denounced the application
of a heightened pleading standard as applied to an employment
discrimination lawsuit, thus reaffirming the FRCP's notice pleading
system.'0 o In so holding, the Court sought to send a message to lower
courts who, despite decisions admonishing them against it,102 continued
to embrace and impose heightened pleading standards.'0o
In Swierkiewicz, fifty-three-year-old Akos Swierkiewicz, a native
of Hungary, sued his former company for allegedly firing him because
of his national origin and because of his age.1 04 Petitioner claimed that,
after he was demoted, his position was filled by a thirty-two-year-old
who had only one year of underwriting experience compared to
petitioner's twenty-six years of experience. 05 The U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York dismissed petitioner's complaint
on the grounds that it did not allege a prima facie case for
discrimination, a precedential requirement, and the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal. 06
Citing Conley, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit,
holding that "under a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to
require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case"'0 o and
the imposition of a heightened pleading standard conflicts directly with
Rule 8(a)(2), which requires simply that the complaint give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds on which that
claim rests.108 Again, the Court relied on the FRCP's allowance of
liberal discovery and summary judgment to narrow the issues and
dispose of those claims that lacked merit.109 To further drive home the
point, the Court reiterated that "Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard
applies to all civil actions," except those provided in Rule 9(b)."o After
applying the proper standard, the Supreme Court found that the
petitioner's complaint satisfied the requirements of Rule 8(a) because it
100. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
101. See id. at 508 (holding that a complaint for an employment discrimination suit need not
"contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case").
102. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 164 (1993) (rejecting the Fifth Circuit's heightened pleading standard for municipal
liability cases).
103. A. Benjamin Spencer, PlausibilityPleading,49 B.C. L. REv. 431, 437-38 (2008).
104. Swierckiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508-09.
105. Id. at 508.
106. Id. at 509.
107. Id. at 511, 515.
108. Id. at 512.
109. Id.
110. Id. at S13.
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gave the respondent sufficient notice of the basis of petitioner's
claims. "
Swierkiewicz was the last Supreme Court decision to address
pleading standards pre-Twombly and seemed to lay to rest any
speculation about these standards. Swierkiewicz, as well as other
decisions that rejected any system of heightened pleading,1 12 stood
boldly for certain pre-Twombly pleading norms. These norms champion
the ideals of simple notice pleading: informing the defendant of the
claim against him and the basis thereof; factual detail was unnecessary at
the pleading stage; dismissal of a complaint was proper only if there
were no set of facts that the plaintiff could adduce that could prove
liability; and reliance on discovery and pretrial procedures to elicit those
facts that were necessary to further frame the issues and weed out claims
that lacked merit.113 Swierkiewicz seemed to finally have reaffirmed
these ideals beyond speculation, but the Twombly decision five years
later effected an unprecedented reversal of course. 114

III.

ONE OF THESE THINGS Is NOT LIKE THE OTHER-THE SUPREME
COURT REVISITS PLEADING STANDARDS THRICE IN TWO YEARS

Three Supreme Court decisions serve as the basis for the current
controversy regarding pleading standards. The Twombly decision ignited
the debate,115 the Erickson decision subtly attempted to water it down,116
and the Iqbal decision erupted a conflagration. 1 17 Despite this confusion
concerning pleading standards, the Supreme Court rightfully called into
question some of those basic tenets of the notice pleading system in light
of modem-day federal civil litigation practices." 8

Ill. Id. at 514. The respondent's main argument was that the petitioner's complaint was too
conclusory. Id. However, the petitioner's complaint alleged, in detail, the events that led up to his
discharge, the relevant dates, and even the nationalities and ages of some of the key persons
involved. Id. The Court held that this information was sufficient to inform the respondent of
petitioner's claim and the basis thereof. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 4, at 1087 ("[N]othing in
Swierkiewicz is at odds with the majority's analysis in Twombly.").
112. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
113. Spencer, supranote 103, at 438-39.
114. Id. at 439.
115. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
116. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (overturning the Tenth Circuit's
dismissal of a complaint because the allegations in question were "too conclusory").
117. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
118. See infra Part ILA-C.
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A. Twombly: From Conceivable to Plausible
Since being handed down in 2007, Twombly necessitates that all
federal civil court proceedings faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss cite to Twombly instead of Conley." 9 Justice Souter, writing for
the seven-justice majority, "retire[d]" Conley's "no set of facts"
language after it "puzzl[ed] the profession for 50 years."' 20 In doing so,
the Court inadvertently created a wave of confusion in lower courts as to
how to apply the Supreme Court's new interpretation of Rule 8(a) and
what the pleadings require to withstand a motion to dismiss. 121 Despite
the confusion, however, even a cursory reading of the Twombly decision
reveals that the Supreme Court "clearly intended to effect some
change"1 2 2 and based its decision on policy concerns that have evolved
greatly since the framers created the FRCP. 123
1. The Facts
In Twombly, a class of consumers who were subscribers of local
telephone and Internet services brought an action in the Southern District
of New York against Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs")
alleging that these ILECs were conspiring to keep local telephone
companies, known as "competitive local exchange carriers" ("CLECs")
from competing in the market. 12 4 The plaintiffs sued under § 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which forbids "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States."l25
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the ILECs conspired to
restrain trade that led to inflated charges for local telephone and Internet
services.126 The plaintiffs claimed that the ILECs engaged in parallel
conduct in their service areas to restrict the growth of the upstart
CLECs12 7 and that the ILECs further agreed not to compete with one

119. See Hannon, supra note 4, at 1820 ("The Supreme Court replaced the oft-cited Conley
language in Twombly.").
120. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
121. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
122. Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks ofTwombly: Will We "Notice" PleadingChanges?, 82 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 893, 906 (2008).
123. See supranotes 59-60 and accompanying text.
124. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549-50.
125. Id. at 550 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
126. Id.
127. Id. According to the complaint, this parallel conduct consisted of "making unfair
agreements with the CLECs for access to the ILEC networks, providing inferior connections to the
networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to sabotage the CLECs' relations with their
own customers." Id.
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another. 128 According to the plaintiffs, this agreement could be inferred
from the ILECs' collective failure to pursue some business opportunities
where they possessed substantial competitive advantages1 2 9 and a
statement from one of the ILEC's chief executives.1 3 0
Defendant phone companies moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and were granted this dismissal by the Southern District of New
York. 3' On the allegations that the ILECs discouraged competition with
the CLECs by conspiring to act in "'conscious parallelism,"' 3 2 Judge
Lynch held that these allegations were inadequate because the ILECs'
behavior could be explained by their interests in their individual
territories. 33 Furthermore, Judge Lynch held that the plaintiffs have
failed to raise the inference that the ILECs' actions were born out of a
conspiracy. 134
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding
that the district court applied the wrong pleading standard against the
complaint. 35 The Second Circuit ruled that the pleading of "plus
factors" was not necessary for parallel conduct antitrust claims to
survive a motion to dismiss.'3 6 In reversing the district court, the Second
Circuit invoked Conley's "no set of facts" language.1 37 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari "to address the proper standard for pleading an
antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct." 38
2. The Majority Opinion
In a decision penned by Justice Souter and joined by six other
Justices, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit.' 39 The Court
reasoned that to plead that the defendant companies engaged in parallel
128. Id. at 551.
129. Id.
130. Id. Richard Notebaert, CEO of ILEC Qwest, stated: "[C]ompeting in the territory of
another ILEC might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that doesn't make it right." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
131. Id. at 552.
132. Id. (citing Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd,
425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 553.
136. Id. (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S.
544 (2007)).
137. The Second Circuit held that "to rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct
fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have to conclude that there is no set of
facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the
product of collusion rather than coincidence." Id. (quoting Twombly, 425 F.3d at 114).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 547, 553.
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conduct, without more, is just as nebulous as the defendants' alleged
conspiratorial activity. 140 The Court then set out to decide what a
plaintiff must plead to sufficiently state a claim under § 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.141
As all pleading queries begin, the Supreme Court analyzed the
requirements laid out under Rule 8(a)(2).142 Justice Souter relied less on
the Rule 8's fair notice requirement and more on the part of the rule that
requires a plaintiff to state the grounds for his entitlement to relief-a
statement requiring enough factual allegations "to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level" and more than just a "formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action."l 43 Justice Souter then held that the
complaint must contain enough factual basis suggesting that an
agreement was in fact made.144 This is where the notion of "plausibility"
was conceived.145 Justice Souter then aligned this concept of plausibility
with Rule 8(a)(2), explaining that this is, as a threshold matter, what the
rule requires. 146 The plaintiffs did not contest this notion of plausibility
in itself but argued that imposing a plausibility requirement at the
pleading stage conflicts with precedent, namely, the Supreme Court's
decision in Conley.14 7 Ultimately, the majority held that plaintiffs'
claims of conspiracy were inadequately pled for lack of plausibility. 4 8
In doing so, it warned that they were not applying any heightened
pleading standard or the need for specific pleadings but that the plaintiffs
have failed to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible, [and] their complaint must be dismissed."l 49

140. See id. at 554 ("The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without
more ... [is] consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.").
141. Id. at 554-55.
142. Id. at 555.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 556.
145. See id. ("Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.").
146. See id. at 557 ("The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not
merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement ofRule 8(a)(2) that the 'plain
statement' possess enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief "' (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))).
147. Id. at 560-61.
148. Id. at 564.
149. Id. at 570.
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a. Say Goodbye to "Conleywood"
Justice Souter realized that Conley's "no set of facts language" can
and has been read in isolation and taken hyper-literally to mean that a
statement of a claim is sufficient unless it seems impossible based on the
four-corners of a complaint.150 Furthermore, the majority opinion
summoned instances in which both jurists and commentators balked at
applying Conley so literally.s15 As a result of fifty years of criticism,
questioning, and explanations, the majority decided that Conley's
language had "earned its retirement." 5 2
b. A Matter of Policy
Importantly, the majority paid more than mere lip service to the
economics implicated by pleading doctrine. 53 In doing so, the Court
explained how requiring a pleading to be plausible on its face has a
fundamental basis in sound economic policy.154 Justice Souter noted that
pleadings need to include sufficiently plausible facts or else plaintiffs
with groundless claims could occupy the time of defendants, as well as
the courts, for the purpose of scaring the other side into increasing the
potential settlement value.15 This concept displays the converse of the
concerns expressed by the framers of the FRCP. 156 However, if
complaints do not require facial plausibility, plaintiffs would have
unfettered access to costly discovery and could use this access to seek
settlements "based on their in terrorem value rather than the actual
merits of the case." 5 7
c. The Dissent: The Majority Went to Extremes
Two Justices dissented from the majority opinion, accusing the
majority of rewriting the FRCP.158 Justice Stevens took exception to the
150. Id. at 561.
151. Id at 562.
152. Id. at 563. Justice Souter then eulogized Conley's famous phrase, burying it "best
forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in
the complaint." Id.
153. See id. at 557-58 (discussing the "practical significance of the Rule 8 entitlement
requirement").
154. See id. (citing to cases discussing the need for plausible pleadings in the face of inevitably
expensive discovery).
155. Id. at 558 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
156. See supraPart II.B.1.
157. Smith, supranote 4, at 1073.
158. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I would not rewrite the
Nation's civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the pleading rules of most of its States
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majority's retirement of Conley, noting that the majority's decision was
the first time any member of the Supreme Court had expressed any
doubt over its adequacy. 159 He undertook a brief historical analysis of
pleading rules to show how Rule 8(a)(2)'s language was artfully chosen
and assembled by its drafters as a response to the failures of past
pleading regimes.16 0 Justice Stevens explained his view that the purpose
of the FRCP's liberal pleading was to keep litigants in court, not out of
it.16 1 He reiterated that, under the FRCP, "separating the wheat from the
chaff is a task assigned to the pretrial and trial process[,]" and that these
policy choices were embedded in the spirit and text of the rules, and thus
federal courts are bound by them.16 2 Bolstering his dissenting opinion
with prior decisions "rebufffing]" the efforts of lower courts attempting
to impose a heightened pleading requirement, Justice Stevens argued
that precedent reaffirmed the notion that "motions to dismiss were not
the place to combat discovery abuse."16 3
Despite rivaling the length of the majority opinion with his very
spirited dissent, Justice Stevens paid mere lip service to the concept that
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a "showing" of one's entitlement to relief-a point
that seemed to headline the majority's opinion. 1 As to the majority's
other headlining concern, Justice Stevens admonished against giving
into "the urge to engage in armchair economics at the pleading stage."1 6 5
Ultimately, Justice Stevens claimed that the "'plausibility' standard is
irreconcilable with Rule 8 and our governing precedents." 6 6 He accused
the majority of making the distinctions between legal conclusions and
factual allegations, which was the "stuff of a bygone era."1 67
History seemed to be repeating itself yet again, 168 and the natives
were getting restless, perhaps fearing a return to this "bygone era."l69

without far more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so.").
159. Id. at 578.
160. Id. at 573-74.
161. Id. at 575.
162. Id. at 583.
163. Id. at 584.
164. See id. at 580 n.6. Relegating this part of his argument to a footnote, Justice Stevens
opined that an adequate "showing" will "depend on the particulars of the claim." Id. He stated that
had the plaintiffs' complaint only alleged parallel conduct or an agreement, then the complaint
would run afoul of Rule 8(a)(2)'s notice requirement and that "[o]missions of that sort instance the
type of 'bareness' with which the Federal Rules are concerned." Id.
165. Id. at 587. According to the dissent, engaging in these "armchair economics" was a
temptation that the Court succumbed to despite "steadfastly resist[ing]" it in the past. Id. at 587-88.
166. Id. at 586.
167. Id. at 589.
168. See supra PartsII.A.2, II.B.1.
169. See supra Part II.A.I.
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The Supreme Court presumptively took notice and responded by
deciding yet another case involving pleading standards.
B.

Erickson: An Attempt to Quell the Uproar?

The Supreme Court revisited the pleading question in Erickson,
only two weeks after deciding Twombly.17 0 A seemingly exciting time
for Civil Procedure buffs everywhere, some hoped that the Court would
undo any heightened pleading requirement it seemed to impose in
Twombly, or at least limit Twombly to the antitrust context. 17 1 In
Erickson, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit decision to
uphold the dismissal of petitioner's complaint, and reaffirmed Rule 8's
liberal pleading standards.1 72
1. The Facts
Petitioner William Erickson, an inmate at Limon Correctional
Facility in Colorado, filed suit in the District Court of Colorado against
the prison's officials alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment.173 Petitioner was diagnosed with
hepatitits C, for which he was receiving treatment.174 This treatment
required a year's worth of weekly injections that Erickson was to
administer himself.175 Some time after the treatment began, prison
officials were unable to account for one of Erickson's syringes, but soon
found it in a communal garbage can, altered in a way that suggested it
had been used to inject illegal drugs.17 6 Prison officials did not believe
Erickson's claims that he was not the reason the syringe was modified.
The officials found that his conduct violated the Colorado Code of Penal
Discipline, and decided to stop Erickson's hepatitis C treatment. 77
Petitioner developed a life-threatening liver condition as a result of the
cessation of treatment.' 7 8

170. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).
171. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also Dodson, supra note 94, at 139
("[O]thers have suggested that Erickson v. Pardus ... mitigates Bell Atlantic's significance.").
172. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 90.
173. Id. at 89-90.
174. Id. at 90.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 91.
177. Id. The prison officials who removed the petitioner from treatment defended this removal
by saying that the hepatitis C treatment could only succeed if the patient was drug and alcohol free.
Id. Erickson would have to wait a year and go through six months of classes to regain his treatment
eligibility. Id.
178. Id.
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Petitioner's complaint alleged that he had hepatitis C, he met the
standards for treatment thereof, and that the refusal of treatment was
causing irreversible harm to his liver that could ultimately result in his
death.179 He attached grievance forms to his complaint, and also alleged
that other inmates died as a result of the same disease.so The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss that was granted by the district
court citing failure to adequately plead that the prison health officials'
actions caused petitioner substantial harm. 181 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed, holding that petitioner's allegations of substantial harm were

"only conclusory."l

82

2. The Holding
The Supreme Court, in a rather terse six-page per curiam opinion
granted review because the "holding departs in so stark a manner from
the pleading standard mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.... 18 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the "liberal pleading
standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2)."1 8 4 In reviewing the sufficiency of
petitioner's complaint, the Supreme Court noted that it would be enough
if petitioner simply alleged his medication was withheld after
commencing treatment, the treatment was necessary, and the officials
were refusing to provide it.185 The Court further chastised the Tenth
Circuit for its dismissal of petitioner's complaint because he was
proceeding pro se and any filings as such should be construed
liberally.18 6
It was not plausibility, but reaffirmations of the liberal nature of
Rule 8(a)(2), that led the Court to hold that Erickson's case cannot be
dismissed because the allegations in his complaint regarding harm were
too conclusory.' 87 The Erickson decision may have been a relief to those
fearing the possible implications of Twombly on the plaintiffs' bar. The
Iqbal decision, however, quickly dissipated this temporary relief.

179. Id. at 92.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 198 F. App'x 694, 698 (10th Cir. 2006)).
183. Id. at 90; see also Bone, supra note 4, at 883 ("The Court went out of its way to chastise
the lower courts for a 'stark' departure . . .
184. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 93-94.
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C. Iqbal: Plausibilityfor All
The pleading controversy was reignited when the Supreme Court
decided Iqbal in May 2009. In a five-to-four decision, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, reversed the Second Circuit holding that
respondent's pleading was sufficiently pled to state a claim for which
relief may be granted.'18 It is interesting to note that the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York denied petitioners' motion to
dismiss, relying on Conley's "no set of facts" language, after which the
petitioners' filed for an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit, which
was not heard until after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Twombly.18 1
1. The Facts
Respondent Javaid Iqbal was a Pakistani Muslim who was arrested
in November 2001 by the FBI on counts of conspiracy to defraud the
United States and fraud regarding identification documents.190 Iqbal pled
guilty to the charges, served his prison sentence, and was deported to
Pakistan.19' He then filed a Bivens action1 92 in the Eastern District of
New York against thirty-four current and former federal officials and
nineteen "John Doe" federal corrections officers alleging a violation of
his civil rights for the treatment he received while in the maximumsecurity detention unit.' 93 These violations consisted of physical and
94
mental abuse inflicted by the prison officials without justification.1
The relevant allegations of Iqbal's complaint involve the
petitioners, former Attorney General John Ashcroft and Director of the
FBI Robert Mueller. 19 5 The complaint alleged that Iqbal was arrested
and detained under the direction of the petitioners and was to be so
detained until cleared by the petitioners.196 Furthermore, the complaint
stated that petitioners not only knew of and condoned this harsh
treatment, but also "willfully and maliciously" agreed to subject him to

188. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1941-43 (2009).
189. Id. at 1944.
190. Id. at 1942-43.
191. Id. at 1943.
192. Id. A Bivens action recognizes the right of a private action against federal officers who
have allegedly violated a citizen's constitutional rights. Id. at 1947. Furthermore, vicarious liability
does not apply in either Bivens actions or § 1983 actions. Id. at 1948.
193. Id. at 1943-44.
194. Id. at 1944. lqbal alleged that the jailors "kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the
face, and dragged him across his cell without justification." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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it because of his ethnicity and not for any justifiable purpose.' 9 ' Iqbal's
complaint named Ashcroft the "principal architect" of the policy and
Mueller as "instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and
implementation."1 98 The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for
failing to sufficiently state allegations showing their involvement in the
conduct.199
Relying on Conley, the district court denied petitioners' motion to
dismiss. 2 00 Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit, who wrestled with
the Supreme Court's latest decision on "assessing the adequacy of
pleadings." 2 01 After concluding that the Twombly decision created a
"flexible plausibility standard" 202 requiring pleaders to include greater
factual detail in those cases and contexts "where such amplification is
needed to render the claim plausible,"2 03 the Second Circuit nonetheless
held that the respondent's pleading was sufficient to allege the
petitioners' personal involvement in the decisions behind the detainment
policy. 20 4 Judge Cabranes, realizing the edgy compromise that must be
made between petitioners' qualified immunity privilege and Rule 8(a)'s
pleading requirements, urged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari,
which it did.205
2. The Majority Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Second Circuit. 20 6
In discussing the sufficiency of respondent's complaint, the Supreme
Court invoked Twombly and reaffirmed that a complaint will be
dismissed if it is devoid of some factual enhancement to back up bare
assertions.2 07 Relying again on policy concerns, the Court held that a
complaint containing no more than legal conclusions cannot unlock the
doors of discovery, and hence only complaints with plausible claims for
relief will survive a motion to dismiss. 20 8 What counts as plausible will

197. Id.
198. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1954 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
202. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157-58 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
203. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
204. Id. (citing Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 174).
205. Id. (citing Iqbal,490 F.3d at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring)).
206. Id. at 1945.
207. Id. at 1949.
208. Id. at 1950.
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be a context-based inquiry requiring the "reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense., 2 09
The Court then developed a two-pronged test for lower courts to
utilize when considering a motion to dismiss. Courts are to separate the
legal conclusions of a complaint since they are not entitled to a
presumption of truth. 210 These legal conclusions must be bolstered with
factual allegations, taken as true.2 11 If they are bolstered, the judge then
decides if they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.2 12 In
conducting its analysis, the Supreme Court held that the allegations that
petitioners willfully and maliciously agreed to subject respondent to
discriminatory treatment were conclusory and not entitled to be taken as
true.213 More was needed to plausibly suggest petitioners' discriminatory
state of mind, and hence the pleadings did not meet Rule 8's
standards.2 14
Iqbal then attempted to limit Twombly's holding to the antitrust
context.215 The Court responded by holding that its decision in Twombly
applies to all civil actions.2 16 Iqbal also argued that pleading standards
should be relaxed because discovery would be minimally intrusive,
relying on the Second Circuit's instruction to the district court to set up a
system of "cabin[ed] discovery" to preserve petitioners' defense of
qualified immunity.2 17 To this the majority responded that gauging the
sufficiency of a complaint does not turn on controlling the discovery
218
process. The majority held that respondent's pleading was insufficient
under Rule 8, and thus was "not entitled to discovery, cabined or
otherwise."2 19
3. The Dissent
Justice Souter, the author of the Twombly decision, wrote the
dissent in Iqbal in which three other Justices joined. Justice Souter
believed the majority misapplied Twombly's pleading standards and
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1951.
214. Id. at 1952.
215. Id. at 1953.
216. Id.
217. Id. Essentially, qualified immunity allows top government officials to carry out their jobs
without the fear of constant litigation. Michelle Spiegel, Comment, Ashcroft v. lqbal: The Question
of a Heightened Standard of Pleading in Qualified Immunity Cases, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 375, 388 (2009).
218. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
219. Id. at 1954.
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incorrectly held that the respondent's complaint was insufficient. 22 0 The
dissent took issue with the majority's application of Twombly.221
According to Justice Souter, Twombly does not require judges to
consider the veracity of factual allegations at the motion to dismiss
stage, but requires accepting them as true no matter how fanciful they
may be.222 Justice Souter explained that Iqbal's allegations of
petitioners' discriminatory intent were neither bare legal conclusions nor
were they, such as in Twombly, consistent with legal behavior. 2 23 The
complaint detailed the discriminatory policy and alleged that petitioners'
were the architects and were instrumental in implementing this policy.
This, opined the dissent, gave the petitioners' "fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" and was sufficient
under Rule 8 to withstand dismissal.2 24
D.

The Confusion

Despite creating an analytical framework and a two-pronged
approach to help lower courts decipher the sufficiency of a complaint,
the Supreme Court in Iqbal realized that plausibility is to be decided
based on "judicial experience and common sense." 2 25 The confusion and
backlash resulting first from Twombly, 226 and now from Iqbal,227 on how
to apply this plausibility standard has resulted in a variety of
interpretations across the circuit courts.228 By relying on their own

220. Id. at 1954-55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 1959.
222. Id. The only exception to this premise, explains Justice Souter, are "claims about little
green men, or the plaintiff's recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel." Id.
223. Id. at 1960.
224. Id. at 1961 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
225. Id. at 1950.
226. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Colleen McMahon, The Law of
Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower CourtsAfter Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 853 (2008) ("We district court judges suddenly and unexpectedly find
ourselves puzzled over something we thought we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a
motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim.").
227. See Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the
PlausibilityStandardAfter Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. lqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV.
505, 518 (2009) ("[T~he actual meaning of the plausibility standard. . . remains as important and as
unclear as ever."); see also Khan & Magee, supra note 34 (displaying the different versions of the
plausibility standard created by different federal circuits).
228. See A. Benjamin Spencer, UnderstandingPleadingDoctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11
(2009) (noting how certain courts now require heightened pleading whereas some adhere to the
liberal notice requirement of pre-Twombly times).
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"judicial experience and common sense," it follows that different judges
will conceive plausibility differently.229
The purpose of this Note, however, is not to try and set forth a
definition of plausibility to be universally followed by the courts. As
admonished by the Supreme Court, that is a context-specific
undertaking. 230 Rather, this Note intends to show that throughout
history, there has been a struggle between granting and restricting access
to the courts. This struggle is continuing to this very day, as is evidenced
by these recent Supreme Court decisions. Until Twombly was decided,
cases such as Conley and Swierkiewicz reinforced the notion that the
purpose of pleading was to simply give notice to the other side. 23 1 Since
Twombly, the Supreme Court has shifted the focus of Rule 8(a)(2) from
a notice requirement to a showing requirement, that is, showing enough
factual content to state a plausible claim for relief. 2 32 Erickson may have
led some to believe that the Court meant to limit Twombly. 233 The
decision in Iqbal, however, showed no such limitation, and the Supreme
Court reinforced its new focus on policy concerns and the effect of these
concerns on pleading practice.234 Whether one agrees or disagrees with
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the Supreme Court has spoken. This
Note applauds the Supreme Court's shifted focus as a needed adaption to
the modern litigation landscape, and seeks to strike a balance amongst
all countervailing interests.
The message the Supreme Court is sending is quite clear-fortify
pleadings with a sufficiently factual foundation or face dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6). 2 35 As discussed above and throughout both the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions, this new vision of the purpose of pleading is well
founded in policy concerns, namely expensive and intrusive discovery,
and is necessary for the fairest administration of justice.2 36 The
229. See Hartnett, supranote 4, at 499 ("Different judges with different life experiences can be
expected to view plausibility differently because they have a different understanding of what is
ordinary, commonplace, natural, a matter of common sense.").
230. See supra Part III.C.2.
231. See supra Part II.B.2-3.
232. See Spencer, supra note 228, at 11 ("Twombly has turned our gaze toward the obligation
under the rule to make a 'showing' that the pleader is ... entitled to relief.").
233. See Gottesman, supra note 94, at 1002-03 ("The strong language in support of the liberal
pleading policy seems to indicate that the Court was reaching beyond the facts of Erickson. It seems
as though the Court was trying to take something back from Twombly and tacitly suggested that
they did not mean to implement a higher pleading standard."); see also Hannon, supra note 4, at
1826 (noting that some commentators believed that "Erickson may serve as an affirmation of
traditional pleading standards more broadly").
234. See supra Part III.C.
235. See supra Part III.C.2.
236. See Bone, supra note 4, at 901 ("At least at first glance, there seems to be something
unfair about a plaintiff forcing a defendant to shoulder the burden of litigation without giving the
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plaintiffs bar must conform accordingly; however, this has not been an
easy transition, especially in certain substantive areas of the law.237
Plaintiffs should bolster their pleadings with factual detail, including
specific names, places, and the circumstances surrounding the alleged
illegal behavior. However, this new emphasis on fact-based pleading has
looming consequences in the instances where a plaintiff simply is not
privy to such information prior to formal discovery.
IV.

THE PUSH FOR POLICY: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT
PLEADING PROBLEM

The Supreme Court, through its decisions in both Twombly and
Iqbal, has affirmed the notion that defendants should not have to be
inconvenienced with litigation by those with factually weak claims, nor
should the doors of discovery be open to those plaintiffs.23 8 In essence,
the Court is sending a message to potential litigants that more will be
required early on to get to the discovery stages of litigation-where
settlement value can be greatly, if not unfairly, appreciated.2 39 Coupled
with this message, by granting district court judges more discretion at
the pleadings stage, these policy-backed decisions should foster striking
a balance between halting meritless lawsuits before they can start and
giving the plaintiff his day in court.240
A. Sleeping in the Bed That Was Made: How District Courts Should
Dealwith the Backlash
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions have caused and will continue to
cause an increase to the number of 12(b)(6) motions filed and,
ultimately, the number of these motions that are granted.241 It follows

defendant any reason why he should do so.").
237. See, e.g., Hannon, supra note 4, at 1838 (explaining the statistically significant results of
an empirical analysis of motions to dismiss in post-Twombly civil rights cases).
238. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007). The Court in Twombly was
concerned with the enormous costs of discovery even though the defendants were communicationindustry giants. Id. The Court in lqbal was concerned with discovery that could reveal confidential
information regarding our national security and bogging down top public officials with the
"concerns of litigation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
239. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 ("[T]he threat of discovery expense will push costconscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.").
240. See Wendy N. Davis, Just the Facts,But More of Them, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1, 2007, 1:12 PM
CDT), http://www.abajournal.con/magazine/justthejacts butmoreof them/.
241. See Yuri Mikulka, Ashcroft v. lqbal: Raising the FederalPleadingStandardfor Plaintiffs
and Providing a New Defense Tool for CorporateDefendants, LAWUPDATES.COM (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.lawupdates.com/tips/entry/iashcroftV.-iqbal-i-raising-the-federal-pleading-standard
for-plaintiffs a/.
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that the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will become an integral and even
greater part of the litigation process than it previously has been.242
Because the motion to dismiss has taken on a larger role and threatens to
deny some access to the courts, it makes sense to create a pre-suit "Iqbal
Motion," where those who lack information to plausibly state their claim
can explain to the judge precisely what discovery or information is
needed to plausibly state a claim for relief without fear of having it
dismissed. By proposing a legislative remedy, the types of suits that
would be most greatly affected by the Twombly and Iqbal decisions will
have a better opportunity to plausibly plead their case. This would, at the
very least, grant the plaintiff his day in court and an opportunity to be
able to cross "the line between possibility and plausibility of
'entitlement to relief."' 2 4 3 The judge would then undertake the "contextspecific task that requires the .. . court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense." 244 As will be discussed later, certain trade-offs
must be made to achieve these ends.245
1. Working with What We Have: FRCP 27
As discussed earlier, history has shown that when a particular
pleading system falls out of favor or becomes unfairly strict, it results in
a wholesale overhaul of pleading doctrine.246 This is not necessary, as a
simple amendment to the FRCP will suffice to balance the scale of
justice and protect those plaintiffs with claims that are inevitably
affected by the Twombly and Iqbal decisions-cases involving
"information asymmetry." 247 An amendment to the FRCP's only rule
regarding pre-suit discovery, Rule 27, will serve as the foundation for
the Iqbal Motion.
As it now stands, FRCP 27 is the only federal rule that speaks to
any sort of pre-filing discovery mechanism. 248 FRCP 27(a)(1) allows for
242. See Spencer, supra note 228, at 11 ("[Dlefendants will be emboldened to challenge the
sufficiency of claims.").
243. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
244. Id. at 1950.
245. See infra Part IV.C.I.
246. See supra Part II.A-B.
247. Spencer, supra note 103, at 488 (defining information asymmetry as "an inability to
identify direct evidence of wrongdoing at the pleading stage"); Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous
Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 542 (1997) (discussing the concept of information and its affects on a
lawsuit).
248. See Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1371, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
("Unlike other discovery rules, Rule 27(a) allows a party to take depositions prior to litigation if it
demonstrates an expectation of future litigation, explains the substance of the testimony it expects to
elicit and the reasons the testimony is important, and establishes a risk that testimony will be lost if
not preserved.").
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a potential party to seek a deposition prior to filing a lawsuit for
purposes of perpetuating testimony. 249 Despite seeming broad on its
face, Rule 27 has generally only been utilized to perpetuate testimony
that may be lost before a trial begins, such as the impending death of a
potential witness.25 0 However, there exists some judicial recognition for
alternative uses, such as when the defendant has exclusive control over
the information the plaintiff needs to sufficiently frame his complaint.25 '
The case Reints v. Sheppard,2 52 shows at least one court's
willingness to allow discovery before the filing of an amended
complaint.25 3 There, a plaintiff alleging a civil rights violation invoked
Rule 27 to support his claim that critical information needed to plead
specific facts was in the defendants' exclusive control.254 Although the
plaintiff ultimately did not prevail in obtaining the court order, the
district court agreed with the principles the plaintiff set forth and in dicta
admitted that it would be willing to grant plaintiffs deposition requests
if he "truly did not have knowledge of sufficient facts to plead his

case." 25 5
In light of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, it now seems
necessary to broaden Rule 27's scope to account for the situations where
a plaintiff may have a meritorious claim but truly does not have access
to the sufficient facts to plead his case. An amended Rule 27, allowing
for the possibility to seek specifically targeted discovery through limited
depositions before the plaintiff files a complaint, provides a weapon for
those plaintiffs facing information asymmetry and the inevitable motion
to dismiss. Thus, through an amended Rule 27, the Iqbal Motion will
take flight.
2. The Iqbal Motion
To serve as a caveat, it first must be understood that the Iqbal
Motion's practical application will naturally be limited to those cases
where evidence of the defendant's wrongdoing is likely to be solely in

249. FED. R. Civ. P. 27.
250. See Bone, supra note 4, at 933 n.249 (discussing the application of Rule 27 and other
cases where targeted discovery was utilized in cases subject to heightened pleading standards and
the information was within the exclusive control of the defendant).
251. See id. (noting instances where Rule 27 was applied to cases where there were no
concerns of impending death or disappearing evidence).
252. 90 F.R.D. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
253. Id. at 347.
254. Id. at 347-48.
255. Id. It should be noted that in Reints, the plaintiff was himself an attorney, a factor that the
court did consider when denying his Rule 27 request. Id. at 347.
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the defendant's possession.256 It would be cheap and abusive for a
plaintiff to seek an Iqbal Motion for a garden-variety tort claim,
unnecessarily wasting the court's and the defendant's time, and the
presiding judge would be remiss if he granted the motion in these
circumstances. Furthermore, the pre-filing discovery allowed by a
granted Iqbal Motion should take the form of depositions or
interrogatories-not requests for documents that would be requested
under normal discovery. These restrictions will help adhere to the
concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in both Twombly and Iqbal.
Those being deposed will have to bring with them certain documents for
reference, but the plaintiff should not be able to request that these
documents be furnished for them before the filing of the complaint.
That brings us to the next issue: who rules on such a motion and
conducts the hearing if necessary? It seems to make sense to have a
magistrate judge conduct the Iqbal Motion hearing. Magistrates play a
large role in the federal judiciary system and are seen as integral
members in the administration of justice.2 57 Since magistrates preside
over pretrial discovery and hearings, they seem an obvious choice to
decide the Iqbal Motion and conduct a hearing if necessary.258
The Iqbal Motion was conceived out of both the Twombly and
Iqbal decisions and the presiding magistrate must hold true to and
respect the policies underlying those decisions-to promote the
adjudication of meritorious claims and to stop the meritless ones before
they can inflict any damage. 259 In seeking a court order for this narrow
pre-filing discovery, the prospective plaintiff will have to prove to the
magistrate that he exhausted all possible opportunities to seek the
information he claims that he needs.
Before the filing of the claim, a potential plaintiff will petition the
court for an Iqbal Motion and serve the defendant with the same. This
request for pre-filing discovery should briefly explain the grounds for
why the plaintiff believes he has a meritorious claim, what information
he believes is missing that is preventing him from simply filing a
256. See Bone, supra note 12, at 873 ("Two notable examples are the types of factual
allegations at issue in Iqbal and Twombly: descriptions of the defendant's state of mind (e.g., Iqbal's
allegations of knowledge, condoning, and willfulness and malice relevant to discriminatory intent),
and references to actions taken in private (e.g., Twombly's allegation of an agreement).").
257. See Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Given the bloated
dockets that district courts have now come to expect as ordinary, the role of the magistrate in
today's federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensible.").
258. See Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78, 88 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Conducting pretrial and discovery
proceedings has been a core component of a magistrate judge's role in civil cases since Congress
created the position of magistrate judge.").
259. See supra Parts III.A.2.b, III.C.2.
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complaint, who he wishes to depose and why, and why he cannot obtain
this information without judicial intervention. He must set out in detail,
attaching affidavits, every attempt made in trying to obtain this
information on his own, and convince the judge that this information is
imperative to the vitality of the plaintiffs claim. Specificity is key and
any ambiguity or lack of clarity should be construed against the party
requesting the Iqbal Motion.260
The filing of this claim should instantly toll the statute of
limitations, so as to not prejudice the plaintiff or bar him from eventually
bringing his claim when he feels ready. If the Iqbal Motion is granted by
the court, but upon completion bears no fruit, the plaintiff should still
have the time to further investigate or develop his claim on his own if he
chooses, despite the outcome of whatever pre-filing discovery the court
allowed.
The potential defendant, upon receipt of the plaintiffs Iqbal
Motion, should have twenty days to file an answer responding to the
allegations. 261 The defendant should try to convince the court why prefiling discovery is unwarranted in this instance, why he has not acted
unlawfully, and explain how the plaintiff has failed to exhaust whatever
investigatory means available to him.
After receipt of the defendant's answer, the judge will make a
decision either granting or denying the Iqbal Motion. The burden of
persuasion should be if, in balancing the equities, it is likely that
discoverable information exists that will push the plaintiffs claim past
Twombly's plausibility threshold. Furthermore, the plaintiff must have
no way of obtaining this information without judicial intervention. If
denied, the plaintiff is in no worse a position than before and is free to
file a complaint, investigate further, or not pursue the claim. No
interlocutory appeal should be granted at this point because this denial is
by no means a final judgment.2 62 If granted, the judge should have
tremendous discretion in tailoring the plaintiffs initial discovery
requests so that they are as minimally intrusive as necessary to help the
plaintiff state a plausible claim for which relief may be granted. As an
example, if a plaintiff is trying to sue for alleged employment
discrimination and is granted an Iqbal Motion, the judge should allow no

260. This would almost mirror the process required by FED. R. CIv. P. 27. See supra Part
IV.A.1.
261. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (specifying that a party has twenty-one days to answer a
complaint).
262. See Hardy v. Knapp, 27 F. App'x 24, 26 (2d. Cir. 2001) ("Generally, discovery orders are
'interlocutory orders that must await final judgment' for appellate review." (quoting New York
State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1350 (2d Cir. 1989))).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss4/5

30

Frankel: May We Plead the Court - Twombly, Iqbal, and the "New" Practice o

2010]

MAY WE PLEAD THE COURT?

I1221

more than two depositions-the plaintiffs boss and the human resources
manager-to be controlled by normal discovery procedures.263
Although the Iqbal Motion seeks to strike a balance between all
countervailing interests, it is by no means foolproof and can fall victim
to the same inefficiencies and injustices that it seeks to rectify.
B. Adding Fuel to the Fire? PotentialShortcomings of the Iqbal
Motion
As discussed earlier, the Twombly and Iqbal decisions have serious
implications, arousing displeasure among legal scholarS264 and
legislators 265 alike. Superficially, the displeasure is based on the thought
that the Supreme Court has overturned fifty years of precedent.26 6 The
backlash runs deeper, attacking the plausibility standard created in
Twombly as "too subjective to yield predictable and consistent results
across cases." 267 The most severe implications, however, come from the
argument that Twombly and Iqbal effectively deny plaintiffs who seek
redress on claims where the defendant has critical private information,268
and this especially affects those claiming civil rights and discrimination
violations. 2 69 Furthermore, some argue that the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions defeat their own purposes by raising other costs, especially
filing and litigation fees, for Rule 12(b)(6) motions.270 As a result, any
solutions posited to enhance judicial efficiency in the Twombly/Iqbal
context would almost inevitably work an injustice to those potential
plaintiffs affected most by these decisions. On the same note, a solution
aimed at restoring access to those plaintiffs will run contrary to the
policy concerns that served as the basis for both Twombly and Iqbal. The
Iqbal Motion can fall prey to both these issues.
1. Judicial Economy
The underlying ideal behind the Iqbal Motion is to expend more
effort and resources earlier on, before the summary judgment stage, so
that only truly meritorious claims proceed and those lacking merit are

263. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1) (limiting depositions to one day of seven hours unless
additional time is needed to "fairly examine the deponent").
264. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
266. See Bone, supra note 4, at 875.
267. Spencer, supra note 228, at I1.
268. Bone, supra note 12, at 878-79.
269. See id. at 879.
270. See Bartlett, supra note 5, at 108 (noting that due to the increasing number of motions to
dismiss that will be filed as a result of Twombly, it will serve to increase costs, not reduce them).
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halted to prevent wasting the resources of the court and the parties
further down the line. However, it seems misguided to believe that by
creating something else to be litigated, one could possibly seek to drive
down costs and the use of resources rather than escalating them.
The federal docket is notoriously overburdened. 27 1 Although not
expressly stated as a concern in the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, one
can reasonably surmise that in requiring factually based pleadings and
opening the door to an increase in motions to dismiss, the Supreme
Court is seeking to rid the federal docket of meritless or undesirable
claims.27 2 By allowing a potential plaintiff to seek limited discovery
before filing a complaint simply because he does not have enough
factual information to ensure the merit of his claim, it seems that the
Iqbal Motion will run up costs to litigants and usurp more time and
resources from an already overworked court.
2. Free Discovery?
At first sight, the notion of the Iqbal Motion seems to run contrary
to the policy concerns addressed in both Twombly and Iqbal-plaintiff
fishing expeditions, costly discovery, and the slim hope of effective
judicial supervision during discovery.2 73 It seems unfair to the
defendants, who the Supreme Court was trying to protect, to add another
procedural option to those plaintiffs who do not have enough
information to plausibly state a claim for relief. If a plaintiff can
convince the judge that the information needed is solely in the
defendant's possession and that he has exhausted all possible means of
obtaining that information, a defendant can literally be forced into a
deposition where he must answer, under oath, the questions of a party
who he knows lacks the information to even bring forth a claim. In
essence, this is free discovery. At least in regular discovery, the plaintiff
has already proved to the court that his claim is sufficient to warrant

271. See, e.g., Robert Bernheim, Puttingthe "Alien" Back into AlienageJurisdiction:Alienage
Jurisdiction and "Stateless" Persons and Corporations After Traffic Stream, 47 ARIz. L. REV.
1003, 1016 (2005) (stating how an overburdened federal docket has some seeking to eliminate
diversity cases from it); Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation
Explosion, " "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichs Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1075 (2003) (positing that the perception of overburdened
federal dockets has led to an increase of summary judgment motions granted); Lisa M. Durham
Taylor, ParsingSupreme Court Dicta to Adjudicate Non- Workplace Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REv. 75,
125 (2008) (discussing how the federal docket is overburdened with employment discrimination
suits).
272. See McMahon, supra note 226, at 868 (opining that the Supreme Court thought it was
"providing relief to the federal docket by making it easier to dismiss complaints").
273. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007).
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discovery and the full development of the issues.274 The Iqbal Motion
allows a plaintiff who has not satisfied the low federal pleading
threshold 2 75 to occupy a potential defendant's time. However, an
explanation of the possible restrictions imposed in an Iqbal Motion and
the ensuing pre-filing discovery may help alleviate these valid and
troublesome concerns.
C.

Using the Iqbal Motion to Address These Concerns

The success of the Iqbal Motion will be achieved by a system of
self-regulation. Restrictions and limitations imposed on Iqbal Motions
will help fortify the policy concerns of the Supreme Court while at the
same time preventing an unfair barrier to the courts.
As discussed above, the new outlook on the purpose of pleadings in
the federal civil system and the standard those pleadings must meet has
different implications for different types of claims.276 Requiring a
pleading to be "plausible on its face" 277 inevitably creates an added
challenge for those plaintiffs who simply do not have access to the
information they need to "nudge[] their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible."27 8 Thus, by creating a new federal rule that
allows a plaintiff to admit that they cannot comply with the Twombly
and Iqbal pleading requirements because the defendant has all the
pertinent information, but still allows that plaintiff an opportunity to be
heard by the court, would strike a balance between judicial efficiency
and justice. The Iqbal Motion is the key to obtaining this balance.
1. Reciprocal Depositions
An important feature of the Iqbal Motion is the "reciprocal
deposition." Simply put, if a party seeks an Iqbal Motion and it is
granted, the practical effect of this is that that party will be able to
question a potential defendant or witness under oath, even though the
deposing party self-admittedly does not have enough facts to plead a
plausible complaint. However, the Iqbal Motion will have an automatic
reciprocal deposition attached to it-allowing the potential defendant to
then depose the potential plaintiff. This is where the Iqbal Motion's selfregulation bares its teeth. Before the party even decides to request an
Iqbal Motion, that party faces the reality and inevitability that the
274. See supra Part III.C.2. (discussing how if a complaint is insufficiently pled, the
complainant is not entitled to any discovery).
275. See supra Part II.B.1.
276. See supra Part IV.B.
277. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
278. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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deposed party will return the favor and depose the party that made the
Iqbal Motion in the first place.
a. Creating Fairness
In allowing a reciprocal deposition, the Iqbal Motion seeks to even
the count between the party who was granted the Iqbal Motion and the
discontented party who is being subjected to a pre-filing deposition. 9
The potential defendant will get an opportunity to depose the potential
plaintiff, drawing out the plaintiff's theory of the case and forcing him to
show his cards. The potential plaintiff will have to take this feature of
the Iqbal Motion into account when deciding whether to request it in the
first place. The reciprocal deposition thus addresses the concern that the
Iqbal Motion allows a potential plaintiff to seek free discovery 28 0-he
must open himself up if he wants the potential defendant to do the same.
This feature should deter some plaintiffs who do not want to show the
defense all of their cards.
b. Creating Efficiency
Mentioned above is the concern over the rising costs of early
litigation, especially pretrial motion practice. 2 8 1 The advantage of the
Iqbal Motion is that it alleviates the fears of filing an insufficiently pled
complaint and facing an inevitable Rule 12(b)(6) hearing. By hammering
out these issues before a complaint is even filed, a prospective plaintiff
will have the foresight into the likelihood of success that his complaint
will be not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Furthermore, the
Iqbal Motion's reciprocal deposition mechanism will give both parties a
taste of what is to come. After the potential defendant deposes the
potential plaintiff, he will learn the facts of the case, the plaintiffs
theory of the case, and what arguments are likely to be made. This
should lead to more efficient litigation if and when the suit is actually
filed. Also, the reciprocal deposition will prevent the potential plaintiff
from being hasty in filing his suit-hopefully resulting in a plausible
claim for relief that will stand in the face of a motion to dismiss, should
one be filed.

279.
movant.
280.
281.

Since this is not regular discovery, the potential defendant would not be able to depose the
The Iqbal Motion would allow this deposition as a matter of right.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part IV.B.l.
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2. The Result
The Iqbal Motion, if utilized incorrectly, can create more waste and
inefficiency.282 However, crafted with the right limitations, it can create
a much sought after balance between efficiency and justice by promoting
a give-and-take between the potential litigants.283 If the prospective
plaintiff is denied his request for court ordered pre-filing discovery, this
does not mean that his complaint will be insufficient. If he is granted this
court order, he can depose a potential defendant or witness to try to
obtain the information that he was previously lacking. Again, this does
not mean that the plaintiff will then have sufficient facts to plead his
complaint. What he will have, however, is the opportunity to further
develop his claim. If, after a brief, concentrated deposition, the
prospective plaintiff did not receive the information he was looking for
because it does not exist or it is not favorable, he will have a better idea
of his complaint's likely success. He may ultimately decide not to bring
the suit, saving the time and resources of the defendant (a Twombly
concern),284 the court (an Iqbal concern),2 85 and the plaintiff himself (an
overlooked, but equally critical concern).286
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether it intended to or not, the Supreme Court, by its decisions
in both Twombly and Iqbal, has flummoxed the legal world and has
made pleading practice the hot-button issue amongst civil procedure
circles.287 The Supreme Court, by requiring a complaint to be facially
plausible, reinforced policy concerns that inherently restrict access to the
courts for certain types of plaintiffs. Although Iqbal reinforced the
concept that plausibility pleading extends to all civil actions, 2 8 8 it is
inevitable that those who will be affected most are the plaintiffs who
simply do not have access to the information needed to make their
claims plausible on their face. Despite seeming like an affirmation of
efficiency over justice, requiring a pleading to be plausible on its face
simply forces a plaintiff to establish the merit of his claim in the initial
complaint. This ensures that the defendant will have full notice of the
claim against him and the grounds upon which that claim rests. If
282. See supra Part IV.B.l.
283. See supra Part IV.C.I.
284. See supraPart Ill.A.2.b.
285. See supra Part III.C.2.
286. See supra Part IV.C.2.
287. See Bone, supra note 4, at 875 (commenting that Twombly and Iqbal have made
"[p]leading rules ... once again a hot topic in civil procedure circles").
288. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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accomplished, the plausible claim will fully open the doors of discovery.
However, there are certain types of plaintiffs that are detrimentally
affected by the Twombly and Iqbal decisions 289-- plaintiffs who simply
do not have access to the information they need to plausibly state a claim
for relief.
If these potential plaintiffs who find themselves suddenly
disenfranchised had some form of legislative alternative, they would be
ensured their day in court and would be granted an opportunity to
convince the judge that information exists, solely in the defendant's
possession, that would allow the plaintiff to cross the plausibility
threshold. The Iqbal Motion can level the playing field while addressing
the concerns of both potential defendants and plaintiffs.
If used correctly, with an eye towards both efficiency and justice,
the Iqbal Motion can achieve a balance between these two oftenantithetical ideals. The Iqbal Motion is more than a "plausible" solution
to the current pleading crisis.
JonathanD. Frankel*

289. See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
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